Marginal Cost Controversies in Swedish Transport Infrastructure Policy by Hasselgren, Björn
Trafikdage på Aalborg Universitet 2012 ISSN 1603-9696 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal Cost Controversies in Swedish 
Transport Infrastructure Policy 
 
Björn Hasselgren 
bjorn.hasselgren@abe.kth.se 
Senior Advisor/Research Fellow 
KTH Royal Institute of Technology 
School of Architecture and the Built Environment 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article analyses pricing and taxation policies for road and railroad infrastructure. According to an 
institutional perspective a full cost coverage principle is appropriate. Viewed through the lens of neo-
classical welfare economics marginal cost based pricing is generally recommended. These questions were 
analyzed by Ronald Coase in a series of articles from 1946-1970 arguing that there was a controversy 
between the two perspectives. Here Coase’s view, which seems surprisingly up to date nearly 70 years 
later, is applied to the Swedish government’s financing principles for transport infrastructure from the 
1940s to the 2010s. 
 
It is argued that it seems reasonable to interpret the discussion in Sweden around pricing and financing 
policies related to transport infrastructure as a controversy between the two perspectives. The controversy 
seems to have been strongest during the 1970s-80s, when the shift from a ‘cost responsibility principle’ to 
a marginal cost principle was most discussed. Reasons for the shift are discussed. The impact by the shift on 
the earlier policy focus on organizational efficiency of the road and railroad agencies is discussed. 
 
1 Introduction  
Transport infrastructure systems are expensive to build but generally cheap to use for every single 
additional car driver or train passenger. There has been a major controversy in many countries around how 
to form an efficient framework for the pricing of the use of roads and railroads. Should e.g. the users pay 
the full cost or only the marginal cost connected to the use of roads and railroads? Is it appropriate for the 
government to cover the financing deficit with general tax revenues, if users pay only the marginal cost? Do 
such subsidies lead to wasteful resource allocation and poor incentives for efficiency?  
 
As the Swedish government had nationalized  of the roads and railroads in the late 1930s and 1940s, it had 
to decide on how to set the fees and taxes for the users of the infrastructure. In brief two different 
principles have been applied in this respect; full cost coverage and marginal cost based financing. 
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These two principles also reflect two different perspectives when it comes to the incentive structure that is 
applied for the management and funding of the organizations responsible for roads and railroads. 
According to one perspective (‘ear-marking’) a direct link between fees and taxes paid by users and 
spending by the government is most appropriate..  According to another perspective ‘someone else’, i.e. 
the general tax payers, via government subsidies or cross-subsidies, have to pay for a considerable part of 
the cost of roads and railroads, leading to less clear incentive structures.  
 
A direct connection between the users and the provider of roads and railroads through ‘the payment 
channel’ could generally be expected to give stronger incentives for efficiency and user orientation than a 
system where funds are channeled through the government with all the possible disturbances and sources 
of mis-allocation risks that the public sector system has. ‘Ear-marking’ by which tax income is allocated for 
e.g. road-purposes is an alternative to direct payments by the users to the infrastructure organizations, 
which resembles some of the featurs of a direct connection between users and producers   
 
The different perspectives for how to finance systems such as transport infrastructure were reflected in a 
series of articles by Ronald Coase in the 1940s and again in the 1970s (1946, 1947, and 1970). The 
reasoning in the articles seems surprisingly up to date after nearly 70 years.  
 
Questions that are focused in this article are: 
- Is it possible to interpret the government’s formation of pricing and taxation policies for the use of 
roads and railroads as a controversy between a full cost coverage principle and a marginal cost pricing 
principle? 
- How can the gradual shift from the full cost coverage policy to the marginal cost policy be interpreted? 
- Did the change in policies also change the policy focus on the incentives for organizational efficiency? 
  
2 Government’s role - Visible or invisible hand? 
2.1 Government activism or market reliance  
 
Over time successive investments in roads and railroads have led to the accumulation of a major asset-base 
which, from an economic point of view can be treated as ‘sunk costs’. One reason is that even if the assets 
represent a considerable value they have few alternative uses. The cost of tearing down roads and railroads 
are also considerable. 
  
The operation and maintenance of pavements, platforms, signal systems etc. is necessary for the use of 
roads and railroads. The use of roads and railroads induces additional wear and tear of the assets. 
Combined these costs are more or less equivalent to the marginal short term costs.  
 
There is a sound economic basis for charging the users of the present road and railroad system only for 
these marginal costs. If also the depreciation of the current systems, as well as investment costs for re-
construction and new-construction of roads and railroads are considered, the cost basis is of course 
considerably much wider than what is represented by short term marginal costs. An even wider cost base is 
represented by additional (generally) net negative external costs.  
 
According to the principles developed in welfare economics through the late 19th and 20th century 
(Ruggles, 1949) a number of scholars such as Marshall, Wicksell, Pigou, Hotelling and Lerner, consumers’ 
marginal utility when choosing different ‘packages’ of goods and services, should be the basis for the 
analysis of resource allocation in the economy. These theories are generally based on assumptions of 
perfect information, free entry and competition and rational actors. The view on organizations is less well 
developed and equilibrium on markets more in focus.  
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Part of the same view is that decreasing-cost industries, such as roads and railroads could be expected to 
be run as nationalized or regulated monopolies in order to avoid inefficiencies sich as overpricing by a 
private sector monopolist. In these cases (only) marginal costs should be charged for the use of the 
products or services. The unfinanced part of the costs, which are not covered for by marginal cost pricing 
based revenues should, according to the same line of reasoning, primarily be paid for by the government 
funded with tax revenues.  
 
Coase in his articles on the ‘Marginal Cost Controversy’ (1946, 1947) presented a different view on the 
preferable way of handling the pricing of services and goods in decreasing cost sectors. The original article 
was written in relief to the Hotelling-Lerner view, with its basis in marginal cost pricing and supporting 
government subsidies. Coase presented four arguments in favor of an alternative pricing system based on 
multipart pricing, with separate payments to cover fixed and variable costs. With such a system the user 
would face the full cost of the resources that are used for the production of the good or service, which 
would confer a correct combined price signal leading to an efficient resource allocation 
 
Coase’s arguments against marginal cost pricing without full cost coverage are condensed into the 
following arguments: 
- Marginal cost pricing would lead to ‘mal-distribution’ of the production factors to different uses, since 
the full costs of these would not be obvious to the user 
- Marginal cost pricing would lead to income distribution from non-users to users and from tax payers to 
users 
- Marginal cost pricing if combined with tax subsidies would lead to “other harmful effects” as the 
economy is more heavily tax-burdened 
- Marginal cost pricing would lead to a risk for over-consumption and lack of information on how to 
spend resources in the future, since price signals are distorted. 
Coase’s discussion emphasizes the central role of the producing organization and its relation to users or 
customers. The organizational view can be traced back to Coase’s 1937-article ‘The Nature of the Firm’. This 
is a clear difference towards the neo-classical view. 
 
Lindsey (2006), going through the later development of economists’ views on road pricing up to the 2000s, 
notes (p 315) that the more institutional sentiment that Coase represents has not been the core element of 
economists’ handling of issues related to road pricing in general. The view represented by Pigou has, since 
the 1940s, according to Lindsey, largely been developed by a number of scholars such as Vickrey, Walters 
and Mohring. Pricing of road-use based on short run marginal cost has been the basis for these later 
scholars’ writing, combined with congestion based charging. Small, Winston and Evans, among others, 
according to Lindsey, have shown that under some assumptions congestion and road damage charges can 
pay for the costs both for capacity and maintenance (p 312). This line of theorizing has also been possible 
to express in mathematics and in graphical form, which has probably added to the strength of this view 
among economists, and also to its strong influence on the public discussion of the pricing issues. 
 
The institutional view, which was exemplified by road and railroad-related themes in Coase’s 1940s articles 
have, according to Lindsey, not been widely developed with further applications in this sector of the 
economy. As an exception the writings of Gabriel Roth can be mentioned. Roth (2006) has edited one of 
the later works where a number of articles discuss the prospects and favors of a more privatized road 
provision. A similar approach is presented by Winston (2010). Winston suggests privatization experiments 
to be introduced as a means for addressing many of the problems of the US transportation system, such as 
lack of innovativeness, lack of resources and slow productivity growth. These two examples show that the 
institutional view is represented also by contemporary scholars, even if the welfare or neo-classical view is 
generally the stronger in discussions around transport infrastructure.  
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While Coase favored a system where roads and railroads were financed without government subsidies the 
more recent institutional studies mentioned above seem mostly to focus on an improvement and 
methodological refinement of the application of marginal cost based financing models. By reducing cross-
subsidies between different transport modes, and striving for setting prices more in line with ‘real’ marginal 
costs (including congestion induced costs) a higher level of efficiency could, , be achieved than in many 
present systems.  
 
This seems to be a view where a move from weaker to more powerful incentives is sought for, while not 
necessarily meeting Coase’s requirements, aiming for full cost coverage. Even if short run marginal cost 
pricing could be expected to raise sufficient resources to cover the full costs of roads in urban congested 
areas this would clearly not be the case in less populated areas. There would thus still be need for 
substantial tax-financing if these models are applied. This is of course something that is even truer when it 
comes to railroads.  
Figure 1  
Coase and Pigou – different views on cost coverage and financing  
Coase
Organizational efficiency
Institutional framework
Pigou
Welfare optimization
Neo-classical framework
Marginal cost 
coverage
Full cost 
coverage
Ear-marking
General tax 
revenue
 
The different perspectives are summarized in Figure 1 above. The x-axis shows different views on whether 
marginal cost vs. full cost coverage should be strived for. On the y-axis the dichotomy between ‘ear-
marking’ (all revenues are directly allocated to the supplier) and the handling of revenues as general tax 
revenues is displayed. Coase’s model, placed in the upper left, combines full cost coverage with ear-
marking (which is not explicitly stated by Coase but might be assumed from the general reasoning in the 
articles). The Pigovian welfare model is displayed in the lower right, combining marginal cost coverage with 
the treatment of revenues from taxes and fees as general tax income.   
 
In Sweden a pricing policy in line with multipart pricing was used for road financing from the 1940s until the 
early 1970s. Fixed taxes for vehicles related to the weight of the vehicle were combined with per liter taxes 
on fuel. Ear-marking of collected revenues for road purposes made the connection between users and 
providing rather close. For railways the pricing structure during the same time period included different 
pricing models tuned to the different market segments, but under a (formal) full cost coverage policy.  
 
Pigovian pricing models have, however, been dominating for roads and railroads since the 1970s. On the 
one hand marginal cost pricing models have been introduced, with rising government subsidies to meet the 
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financing deficit. Ear-marking has also become less obvious and to some extent even abolished by more 
strict fiscal regulation in Sweden aiming for preserved macro economic and fiscal balance. 
 
2.2 Differences between the theoretical approaches 
  
According to welfare economics it is relatively easy to draw the conclusion that market failures are at hand 
and that government intervention is justified to correct market outcomes. There is only limited focus in this 
perspective on the organizational aspects of government operation, such as transaction costs, lack of 
information and weak incentives for efficiency in public sector organizations. Equillibrium oriented analysis 
is generally in focus in this view. By applying marginal cost financing and pricing principles the government 
is inserted between the users and the infrasructure providers for channeling additional funding or 
redirecting funding between transport modes. This makes the relation between the provider and the user 
less clear. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
Government intervention connected to marginal cost financing 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand Coase presents a view were organizations and institutions matter. According to this view 
it is not at all taken for granted that market failures are at hand as often as neo-classics claim. Instead 
market solutions, where actors learn over time when facing full-cost based prices, are an important 
alternative to government intervention. Government action is seen as problematic with possible 
inefficiencies both when it comes to the internal operations of the public sector system and the negative 
effects on price signals tax-funded activities might bring. Private sector organizations directly financed by 
users are believed to be more dynamic and efficient, according to this view. Organizational change and 
learning is generally more closely connected to the institutional view than to neoclassic welfare theories.  
 
The more direct relation between user and infrastructure provider according to this model is illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 
Direct relation between user and provider 
 
 
 
 
3 Controversies over marginal costs and the government’s role in 
Sweden 
This section is based on studies of the public documents from government committees, government bills 
and Parliamentary reports and decisions from the mid-1920s until the2010s. 
 
3.1 The Full Cost Coverage Period 
 
Following the nationalization of roads and railroads in Sweden by the late 1930s and early 1940s the 
government initiated the post war planning in the transport-sector. The first post world-war two Transport 
Policy Committee started its work in 1944. It presented its final report in 1947 (SOU 1947:85).  
The overriding principle for the management, planning and financing of transport infrastructure was 
defined to be to aim for efficiency, expressed as the highest possible output in relation to the resources 
used in the sector. In addition to this a principle of full cost responsibility for every single transport mode 
was proposed.  
 
Overall the Committee had a positive view on the value of free enterprise and competition as a basis for 
the development of a sound and efficient transport system. Dynamism, technological development and 
competition were seen as superior aspects of a free market, compared to a government controlled 
development or ‘dirigisme’. A number of proposals where put forward by the Committe in order to improve 
the organizations’ functioning and to set a more stable inistitutional environment in the sector, fostering 
efficiency. 
 
The 1944 Transport Policy Committee´s proposals were, according to Sannerstedt (p 5, 1979), never 
followed by any explicit proposals by the government. When reading the government’s yearly budget bills 
for the years following the war-end the government instead focused on the need for tackling the overriding 
economic policy dilemma with a strong growth in consumption and imports and the need for investments 
in most areas of the economy. To set up a separate road-management structure, as suggested by the 1944 
Committee, was never proposed. 
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The future of the general transport policy was in focus of the 1953 Transport Policy Committee, reporting 
in 1961 (SOU 1961:23). It presented a coherent plan for a sustained market oriented transport policy with 
focus on deregulation, where major parts of the remaining war-time regulations should be abolished. The 
basic strategy with the business-economic framework and the ‘cost responsibility principle’ was also to be 
kept. 
 
The basis for efficiency of the system was, according to the Committee, that the true costs of the different 
transport modes were reflected in the prices that the transport users met. This was a direct link to the ‘cost 
responsibility principle’ of the 1940s and 50s. This would make the choices in each situation efficient and 
also lead to a subsequent separation of transport flows to the different modes according to their relative 
strengths.  
 
The Committee also discussed marginal cost-based pricing principles, which were said to be the correct 
pricing principle for the existing network at any given time. The Committee had at the same time the view 
that for new-construction the users should be charged the full costs of the projects. In a situation with a 
strong projected investment growth full-cost coverage would set a frame for the total investment volumes. 
There had been concerns over risks for ‘over-investment’, maninly voiced by the ministry of finance. These 
concerns could be met by this ‘two-tier’ pricing policy. 
 
The Transport Policy Committee’s work was commented on in the government’s proposal to Parliament in 
1963 (1963:119).The government more or less endorsed the proposals of the Committee. This decision also 
summarizes the rather strong focus on the ‘cost responsibility principle’ during this period.  
 
3.2 The Mixed Policies Period 
 
Through the 1960s there was a growing public discussion on the future development of the transport 
system. One of the effects was that there were political claims for the railroad to be protected from further 
reductions and questions were also raised whether the projected strong growth of the number of motor 
vehicles. The proper estimation of the social costs of the road-system, and the possible application of the 
socio-economic principles also for the railroads was therefore one of the concerns in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s when discussing transport policy.  
 
In order to answer to the public pressure for a revised transport policy as the critique against the perceived 
road-transport ’favoritism’ and the cautions that the railroad-system was disadvantaged by the prevailing 
policies, the government decided to set up a new Committee, the 1972 Transport Policy Committee.  
 
The government aimed for a redirection of transport policy. The Committee expressed the main features of 
the new transport policy to be the wider socio-economic goals. Within a framework of government 
ownership of transport infrastructure and socio-economic principles the transport services should, 
however, be carried out with the overriding aim to achieve business economic efficiency.  
 
In a report from the Committee in 1978 (SOU 1978:31), focusing on the cost responsibility principles and 
fee-structures, the view that the cost responsibility perspective should be abolished for both railroads and 
roads was advocated. 
 
The Committee thus emphasized the socio-economic perspective when it came to the management, 
financing and planning of transport infrastructure. At the same time it only slightly discussed the need for 
efficiency in the production of the services and the management of the government agencies in the area. 
Only one paragraph was included in the 1978-report (p 41) discussing the need for a focus on the ‘internal 
efficiency’ of the agencies (and other organizations) in the transport sector. Little was said in this respect 
other than that “intense rationalization- and cost-reduction” should be the focus of the organizations and 
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that “motivation” (for reaching efficiency) is important as the marginal cost principle for fees will probably 
not give the best prerequisites for (‘internal’) efficiency.    
 
The government sent its proposal to Parliament in 1979 (1978/79:99). The 1963 goal for transport policy 
was proposed to be changed in line with the proposal from the 1972 Transport Policy Committee. A new 
overriding goal for transport policy reflecting the shift to a socio-economic stance was proposed by the 
government. 
Marginal cost based pricing was seen as the preferable principle for future decisions on the prices and taxes 
in the area, and primarily when it came to the use of the existing network. At the same time the difficulties 
in applying these principles were reflected on. The fiscal objectives of the government were emphasized, 
showing that the full cost perspective was still valid to some extent. 
 
The 1979 parliamentary transport policy decision did, however as it turned out, not have enough stability 
and impact to change the actual policies pursued by th egovernment and the agencies.. The government 
therefore had initiated a renewed work for analyzing the transport policies already by the mid 1980s.  
 
A number of reports were presented by the ministry of communication during the 1980s as a result of 
preparations for a coming transport policy decision. One of the reports prepared for the decision 
concerned the cost responsibility of the transport sector, and was published in 1987 (DsK 1987:4). In this 
report the connection between the financing principles and the organizational or internal efficiency of the 
separate transport modes was also discussed. It was argued that a cost-responsibility principle would give 
stronger incentives for efficiency than if fixed costs were covered by general tax-income. The report finally 
proposed something close to a mix of the 1963 and 1979 transport policy decisions in these respects.  
 
The government, in its proposal to Parliament in 1988 (1987/88:50), concluded that the principles of the 
1979-decision had not fully been implemented in the sector. The different market-conditions in the sub-
sectors where the transport modes operate had, according to the government, over time been more 
important than the overriding political principles as decided in the transport policy decisions.  
 
As the communication minister discussed the cost-responsibility principle in transport policy area the 
conclusions and proposals were very close to the proposals in the 1987 ministry report. A marginal cost 
principle was thus proposed as a principle for short term costs while a (full) cost responsibility principle was 
proposed to cover for all fixed costs, which should be borne on a decentralized level in the system.  
 
Competition between the transport modes and the importance of the free choice of transport customers 
and users were further emphasized in the proposal. Here, the government took a step back from the more 
vaguely formulated principles from 1979, where the basic principle was that the ‘financing gap’, following 
the introduction of marginal cost based prices, should be covered by government financing rather than by 
sub-sector cost responsibility. 
 
The period from 1963 to 1988 was clearly a mix of principles and shifting policies. The period started and 
finished with more or less similar formal policies; a market friendly policy with focus on full cost coverage, 
with a foreword for socio-economic calculation to guide investment decisions combined with marginal cost 
based pricing to some extent. During this period there had, however, clearly been a controversy over which 
principles to follow. 
 
3.3 The Social Marginal Cost Period 
 
The 1988 parliamentary decision seems to have had as limited impact on the ‘real world’ practical policies 
as the 1979 decision. One  main result of the 1988 decision was the split of the former railroad agency into 
an infrastructure manager and a new transport service oriented railroad agency. Growing deficits in the 
railroad operationis however, once again, was one of the main concerns of the government. Once again a 
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government Committee was launched. The focus was a general reform of transport policy. The Committee 
proposed a widened role for transport policy to explicitly include areas such as regional policy, 
sustainability, traffic safety etc. This marked a shift to a more clearly politicized agenda for transport policy 
than earlier.  
 
The report (SOU 1997:35) from the 1996 Transport Policy Committee was also more openly political in its 
style than earlier reports in this policy area. Transport policy was described as a clearly political policy area 
where the main focus should be the achievement of political goals rather than to see transport policy and 
transport systems as functional systems. 
The Committee reflected on the issue of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ efficiency of the transport system with a 
view that a cost responsibility principle would give a good framework for internal efficiency, more so than a 
socio-economic framework with tax-funding of fixed costs. A number of reasons were, at the same time, 
presented as support for rejecting the cost-responsibility principle. 
 
In a few sections in its final report (p 138 ff) the Committee concluded that the former (1963 and 1988) 
policies were deficient as guiding principles. The (once again) new policy was proposed to be that short 
term socio-economic costs should be the basis for fees and taxes. Financing of fixed costs should 
(normatively expressed) be covered for by general tax revenues. At the same time some additional funding 
from users should be possible in specific cases, to open for efficiency gains in addition to what cost benefit 
analysis shows.  
 
In its proposal to Parliament in 1998 (1997/98:56) the government held a view close to the 1996 Transport 
Policy Committee. However, as in earlier decisions that have been reflected on in this article, the 
government was more pragmatic in its stance than the Committees working with the questions. The 
government thus, in its basic “transport policy principles” (p 36 ff) clearly outlined that, even though 
transport policy was one policy area among many other and that transport issues mainly are to be treated 
in relation to the political goals and not primarily as a functional system, transport services at the same 
time have to based on the principles of decentralization of demand and user choices. It is, according to the 
government’s proposal, through the active choices of users and customers of transport actors that 
efficiency and development is achieved.  
 
When it comes to the view on the cost responsibility in the transport sector the government was clear that 
the basic principle should be that prices and taxes should reflect the marginal socio-economic costs of the 
use of the transport infrastructure, with a focus on internalization of ‘external effects’.  
The decision in 1998 has been confirmed by two later decisions on transport policy in 2006 
(2005/2006:160) and 2008 (2008/09:35). Short term social marginal costs as the basis for the charging of 
fees and taxes has been the ‘new cost responsibility principle’ of transport policy since the late 1990s and it 
is also part of the EU transport policy framework.  
 
The third period clearly marks a shift towards a policy with marginal cost pricing and an internalization of 
cost elements representing external effects when it comes to transport infrastructure, signaling openness 
to government ’interventionism’. The focus on the incentives for efficiency in the organizations delivering 
the services had been reduced compared to earlier periods. 
  
4 Theory and practice – has there been a controversy?  
4.1 A controversy? 
 
The discussion around the government’s view on the principles that should govern the financial regulation 
and pricing principles for roads and railroads since the 1940s shows a general trend from the ‘cost 
responsibility principle’ to the marginal cost coverage principle. The basic principle that each transport 
mode should cover the full costs through the collection either of fees from the users (as for railroads) or 
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through taxes or compulsory fees (as for roads) has, over time, more or less been abandoned in favor of a 
view more based in neo-classical welfare economics, with a marginal cost coverage principle as the basic 
concept.  
This article has shown that, at least on the official policy level which is the focus here, the discussion around 
pricing and financing policies related to transport infrastructure can be seen as a controversy between the 
two different perspectives as outlined by Coase in his 1946 and 1947 articles. The controversy seems to 
have been most obvious  during the 1970s-80s. Since then the marginal cost principle has been the 
dominant policy. This development has been underpinned through an emphasis on this perspectivealso in 
EU-policies. 
 
4.2 Reasons for the change in policies 
The change in policies can be seen as influenced by a number of reasons. Some of these reasons are 
outlined here as suggestions or hypotheses to be further developed and exemplified in coming research. 
Among those reasons is a general shift towards a government intervention-stance of the political debate in 
Sweden that might be seen as a ‘common denominator’ explaining the move away from the cost-coverage 
policy to the marginal cost policy. Growing environmental concerns in combination with a generally less 
road-friendly stance in the society at large worked together in favor of a stronger political support for 
subsidizing railways, perceived to be the ‘environmental friendly’ alternative. Government intervention was 
seen as a remedy to many different perceived shortcomning on the market. 
 
As Sannerstedt (1979) has shown there was a wide-spread criticism towards the reduction of the railroad 
system in the public debate in the 1960s, following the 1963 transport policy decision. The critical stand-
points were reflected in a debate-book (‘Ska vi asfaltera Sverige’1) by a group of social democrats (Anell, 
Hedborg, Lönnroth, Ingelstam, 1971) discussing the effects of the expansion of the road system and arguing 
for a revised transport policy. One main point in the book was the perceived too road-transport friendly 
stance of transport policy. Another key element of the critique was that road traffic in general did not pay 
for its full ‘social’ cost, claiming in specific that ‘externalities’ were not included in the calculations of the 
cost-base. Rail-roads on the other hand, it was argued, had to pay their full costs, which rendered them a 
too weak competitive situation in relation to road traffic. 
 
Another critical standpoint was raised by Peter Bohm, a well known Swedish economist at the time, active 
e.g. in transport economics. Bohm argued (Bohm, 1973) that the 1972 road tax Committee was heading for 
the ‘right’ principles for the future; socio-economic short term marginal costs as the basis for pricing 
decisions. The ministry officials and the prevailing transport policy could though, according to Bohm, be 
expected to work for a too strong focus on the principle of full cost coverage.  
 
A general and comprehensive critique of the 1963 transport policy and its effects was published in 1974 by 
Bohm (et al). Here, the critical voices of the late 1960s and early 1970s, in specific against road-planning, 
were the starting point of the discussion. Through a wider use of cost-benefit analysis and welfare 
economic principles a redirection of the transport policy to focus more on welfare based efficiency should 
be achieved, it was argued.   
 
Welfare economic based marginal cost-theory, besides being theoretically backed, seems also to have 
opened for more active policy and government intervention, which could be a political solution to a 
situation with demand for a wider policy orientation.. The fiscal interest in revenues from road-transport 
based taxes, which grew stronger through the 1970s, might also have made the earlier strict connection 
between revenues and government appropriations less favored from a fiscal policy (ministry of finance) 
                                                          
1 ”Should Sweden be asphalted?” 
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perspective. The income surplus from these taxes could be used for other purposes in a situation with 
growing public funding of different activities, e.g. coverage of growing deficits in railroads. 
 
The academic support for a shift to socio-economic calculation for transport infrastructure spending, also 
seems to have fitted well into a political system looking for a way of ‘formalizing’ the stronger interest in 
deliberative planning processes of roads and railroads. Through the use of calculation of social costs (with 
cost benefit analysis) there was a method for including external variables into the discussion without losing 
too much of the rationalist stance of earlier government infrastructure planning.  
 
 
4.3 Focus on incentives for efficiency changed? 
  
A possible way to express this change in policies might be that there has been a shift in focus of the 
discussion from a view close to Coase’s standpoint in the 1940s, where organizations matter for the overall 
efficiency of the sector and where the efficient operation of the road and railroad agencies was an 
important concern for the government and government committees analyzing the policy area. The present 
focus, which has grown stronger since the 1970s, has been that maximization of welfare-surplus should be 
the overriding goal of the government’s policies. This shift in policy stance is presented in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4 
The marginal cost controversy of Sweden’s transport infrastructure policy 
 
 
 
The shift might be interpreted as a departure from the focus on ‘internal efficiency’ of the producing 
organizations and their relation to the users to a focus on ‘external efficiency’. As Figure 2 shows this focus-
change has also been combined with a move from a principle of ‘ear-marking’ of the government’s 
revenues from (primarily) road transport to be used for road-maintenance and investments, to a model 
where all government revenues are treated as ‘general tax revenues’ to be used at the discretion of the 
Parliament and government in yearly budget decisions.  
The incentive effects connected to the different pricing principles were discussed in the public documents 
as shown earlier. However, the focus on these questions has become less marked over time. The post 
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second world war discussion was clear in this respect. Later discussions on these matters have been less 
developed.  
The shift in practical handling of the revenues and costs has been combined with a growing fiscal net 
surplus from road taxes and fees compared to government’s spending on roads. For railroads the opposite 
is true. Growing deficits in the railroad sector have led to a strong dependence on government funding in 
the railroad sector. If Coase’s cautions towards policies of this kind should be listened to we should expect 
the overall efficiency of the operations of the systems to have been reduced as the incentives for efficiency 
has become weaker. 
 
One additional observation is that the government, at least since the 1990s, has acted with a ‘market-
failure stance’ as the dominant view on the functioning of the transport infrastructure system, quite a 
move from the market-economy stance expressed e.g. by the 1944 Transport Policy Committee. There are 
less obvious examples where the government has acted in order to strengthen the institutional 
arrangements, such as proprietary rights, in order to have a more efficient spontaneous process of 
negotiations between parties involved in ‘market-failure’ situations.  
 
The possible reciprocity of such negotiations and the institutional variance that Coase (1960) pointed to as 
important for efficiency and sustainability have not been a focus of the government’s policies. The 
government’s interventionist stance might have enforced less efficient structures compared to those Coase 
suggested, if analyzed from a cost efficiency and customer perspective. The fulfillment of the wider political 
goals developed over time for the infrastructure sector might though have been improved.    
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